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Talking the Walk: The Deflation Response to Legitimacy Challenges 
ABSTRACT  
Organizations need legitimacy to be able to operate effectively. Consequently, and just like 
their participants, Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) need to respond when faced with 
legitimacy challenges from external parties. We build on current theory to identify three 
organizational elements that can be made the subject of legitimacy critique – i.e., statutory 
procedures, objectives, mechanisms – and use these elements to structure our analysis of a 
conflict-ridden case concerning the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). Whereas prior 
work suggests that organizations can respond to such conflicts in a fashion consistent with 
either moral entrapment or decoupling, we show that organizations can also respond by 
deflating their statutory procedures and objectives. A deflationary response can help 
organizations maintain their validity by diminishing the ability of external parties to advance 
propriety legitimacy critiques against them. By examining this alternative response, we 
expand the scope and refine the analytic detail by which organizational legitimacy conflicts 
can be investigated. 
Keywords  
Conflict; Deflation; Legitimacy; Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives; United Nations Global 
Compact. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many organizations are at risk of being accused of not ‘walking their talk’ when their 
professed policies and practices are not matched by their actual policies and practices. Such 
accusations represent a key challenge to organizational legitimacy and have been variously 
discussed in terms of organizational hypocrisy (Brunsson, 2002), window-dressing (Kolk & 
Perego, 2014), greenwashing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Marquis, Toffel & Zhou, 2016) or 
mission drift (Grimes et al., 2017). Indeed, as the identity, actions and image of organizations 
are expected to be consistent (King & Whetten, 2008), such critique threatens the positive 
perception or evaluation of organizations. It raises fundamental questions about their 
legitimacy, trustworthiness, integrity, authenticity and/or sincerity (Baumann-Pauly, Nolan, 
van Heerden & Samway, 2017; den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker & Kooijmans-van Lankveld, 
2014; Shymko & Roulet, 2017; Whetten, 2006).  
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are an interesting case in this respect due to their 
explicit association with pro-social goals. MSIs are, after all, voluntary and self-regulatory 
cross-sector governance structures that aim at enabling their participants (businesses and 
other organizations) to address moral concerns, such as in relation to environmental, social, 
human rights, and sustainability issues, in a socially legitimate fashion (e.g., de Bakker, 
Rasche & Ponte, 2019; El Abboubi & Nicolopoulou, 2012; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; 
O’Rourke, 2006). It thus is not surprising that MSIs sometimes face legitimacy challenges 
from external stakeholders (just like their participants whose behavior they seek to modify 
such that it matches their standards). These challenges are often based on the claim that a 
given MSI lacks integrity, ‘suffers’ from mission drift, or, even more fundamentally, is ill-
suited to achieve their publicly stated objectives (e.g., Moog, Spicer & Böhm, 2015). In 
general, then, such critique will be based on a claim that there is a discrepancy between a 
MSI’s actual versus professed policies and practices, between its claimed or aspired identity 
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and its actions (Grimes et al., 2017), or between its policies and practices and a challengers’ 
expectations.  
In addition to these points, the literature also suggests that MSIs, just like organizations in 
general, can respond to such critique in either of two ways. First, they may respond in accord 
with moral entrapment by upgrading their actual policies and practices to comply with their 
own previously professed principles, objectives, ambitions, procedures, and so on (Haack, 
Schoeneborn & Wickert, 2012). Alternatively, MSIs may respond in accord with decoupling 
by maintaining the discrepancy, by keeping their actual, extant and purportedly inadequate 
policies and practices in place whilst continuing to publicly profess their previously stated 
and relatively high ambitions (Jamali, 2010). It is generally presumed that such 
organizational responses – decoupling and moral entrapment – will improve audience 
perceptions of the organization and restore its legitimacy, trustworthiness, integrity, and/or 
authenticity (e.g., Grimes et al., 2017). 
These two responses relate to the broad question of how organizations “respond to 
pressures of responsibility and accountability” (Garsten & Hernes, 2009: 4). However, as we 
became aware of the response to legitimacy critique by the Global Compact Office (GCO) 
and its Board, who are responsible for managing and overviewing the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC), it became clear these two responses only comprise part of the story: the 
UNGC’s response was different from both the moral entrapment and decoupling responses 
that the literature led us to expect. We thus decided to conduct a longitudinal case study of 
this puzzling affair, and asked: How can we best understand the UNGC’s response to this 
instance of legitimacy critique? 
The case focuses on a conflict whereby the GCO and its Board were challenged by a 
group of external critics over a seven-year period (from May 2008 through to February 
2015). The source of the conflict was a set of human rights concerns relating to the 
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controversial Sudanese operations of the parent company of one of the UNGC’s corporate 
members. The critics demanded that the GCO use its statutory procedures and objectives to 
address the situation. Rather than responding to the conflict in accord with either the moral 
entrapment or decoupling responses, however, we found that the GCO responded – much to 
the dismay of the antagonists that initiated the conflict – with a downward adjustment of its 
statutory procedures and objectives. Instead of promising to ‘walk its talk’ (moral 
entrapment) or engaging in evermore front of house ‘spin’ (decoupling), the GCO responded 
by ‘talking its walk’.  
We propose that the case is theoretically relevant as it provides a striking example of a 
third response strategy to legitimacy challenges that we term deflation. We argue that 
deflation occurs when an organization responds to a legitimacy critique by lowering or 
downgrading the level of ambition pertaining to its previously professed policies and 
practices in order to make them consistent with their actual, purportedly inadequate, policies 
and practices. Deflation comprises a response that is different from both moral entrapment 
and decoupling, and logically completes the range of viable responses that organizations can 
employ in the face of legitimacy critique. Moreover, by examining and explicating deflation 
as a third response strategy to legitimacy critique, we shed further light on the question of 
“whether and how organizations comply or fail to comply with external political demands” 
(Weber & Waeger, 2017: 51).  
We structure the paper as follows. First, we examine the literature on MSIs and external 
legitimacy conflicts. We then introduce our more detailed empirical research questions, 
explain our research design and methods, and present our case analysis. In the discussion 
section, we outline deflation as an alternative and hitherto unidentified response to legitimacy 
challenges. In our conclusion, we reflect on the potentially disheartening nature of our 
findings and offer suggestions for future research. 
 Page 6 of 53 
THEORY 
MSIs are private governance structures, or voluntary rule-systems, oriented to helping resolve 
social, environmental, human rights, or sustainability issues that governments and inter-
governmental bodies cannot address easily or effectively (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). 
Participants in MSIs include multi-national companies, the primary targets of their regulation 
(Büthe, 2010), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Public authorities, and other 
interested parties (e.g., trade unions), regularly participate in them as well. The foundation of 
MSIs is often portrayed as the resolution of conflict between multi-national companies and 
NGOs (Bartley, 2007). For example, the Fair Labor Association was established to improve 
labor practices in the garment industry’s global supply chains by fostering cooperation 
between major industry incumbents and their NGO critics (O’Rourke, 2006).  
The ways in which such cross-sector collaboration can be deployed to facilitate conflict 
resolution, foster societally beneficial outcomes, and create ‘win-win’ situations for their 
participants and other stakeholders, are important themes in studies of MSIs. Their 
importance is also evident in how MSIs themselves present their mission and activities, 
emphasizing the non-conflictual, consensual and positive, nature of their initiatives. Beyond 
thus claiming pragmatic and moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) for themselves, MSIs also 
emphasize how their participants may enjoy legitimacy benefits. Thus, MSIs such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI website), the Fair Labor Association (FLA 
website) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI website) propose that participating 
companies benefit from satisfying the diverse stakeholder interests they seek to honor.  
Nevertheless, and arguably because of such legitimacy claims, MSIs can be the subject of 
legitimacy challenges by external critics, such as NGOs and social movement activists (Mena 
& Palazzo, 2012; Moog et al., 2015). External legitimacy challenges may not only negatively 
affect the MSI but also its participants; they often rely on their involvement with an MSI for 
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marketing and public relations purposes and as a point by which to differentiate themselves 
from competitors. Legitimacy challenges can be a risk for organizations if the challenger’s 
critique gains wider support and traction. That is, when the challenger’s individual legitimacy 
judgments (propriety legitimacy) becomes a shared, collectively held social legitimacy 
judgment (validity) (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). 
In light of the above, and in anticipation of our subsequent case analysis, we now proceed 
to examine how MSIs may respond to legitimacy critique, and identify three organizational 
elements – i.e., statutory procedures, mechanisms, objectives – that can be the subject of such 
critique.  
Responding to Legitimacy Critique 
Because legitimacy critique has the potential to undermine an organization’s validity and 
thereby its ‘license to operate’, challenged organizations will often deem it necessary to 
respond. When the critique relates to such basic matters as organizational integrity, to the 
collectively held belief or perception that an organization does not live up to its own 
professed standards, then the organization’s validity is very clearly at stake (Bitektine & 
Haack, 2015). In seeking to protect or restore its legitimacy in the face of integrity critiques, 
the literature suggests that organizations can employ one of two responses. 
First, organizations can respond in accord with what has been termed ‘moral entrapment’ 
(Haack, et al., 2012). The basic idea here is that organizations, having committed to a set of 
principles, will subsequently be inclined to ‘walk their talk’, “to start enacting their promises” 
given “knowledge that they will be held publicly accountable for their behavior” (Haack & 
Scherer, 2014: 234-235). If a participant of the UNGC, for example, were accused of not 
complying with its labor rights standards, but subsequently proceeded to ‘lift its game’ so that 
it does comply (Oliver, 1991), it could be said to have acted in accord with the moral 
entrapment response.  
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Second, it has been proposed that organizations can respond to legitimacy critique by 
employing a ‘decoupling’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 356-357) response. Decoupling occurs 
when organizations use concealing or buffering tactics (Oliver, 1991: 154-155) and thus 
avoid having to live up to the level of ambition as expressed through their publicly professed 
standards or commitments. Impression management, perception management, window 
dressing, denial, contextualization (i.e., offering justifications and excuses), and so on, can all 
be part of a decoupling response. In this way, organizations engage in ‘spin’: they try to 
isolate what they say from what they actually do. An organization, for example, might say 
that it is willing to reduce the negative environmental impact of its products and services, but 
continue to make products and services that pay little if any attention to considerations such 
as climate change, pollution, recycling, and so on (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Marquis, et al., 
2016). 
The moral entrapment and decoupling responses can be, and clearly have been, deployed 
by organizations confronted with mission drift and other kinds of integrity-related legitimacy 
critiques. Nevertheless, as our case suggests, organizations may also deploy yet another 
response, in casu deflation. Deflation is a response to legitimacy critique by which an 
organization begins to ‘talk its walk’: it lowers – ‘deflates’ – the level of ambition found in its 
previously professed standards so as to make its pronouncements consistent with its actual, 
ongoing, and purportedly inadequate, levels of behavior. 
Organizational Elements and Legitimacy Critique 
Further to identifying the moral entrapment and decoupling response strategies, the literature 
suggests that different organizational elements can be made the subject of legitimacy critique 
(e.g., Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Scharpf, 1999; Zürn, 2004). In building on this literature, we 
term these elements an organization’s statutory procedures, mechanisms and objectives.  
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Statutory procedures. Statutory procedures refer to the policies, processes, and practices 
that relate to the governance of an MSI, and to the ways in which different interests and 
constituents are included therein (Bäckstrand, 2006; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007). Some of the 
most prominent debates in business ethics and organization theory are focused on statutory 
procedures. For instance, debates between stakeholder (Evan & Freeman, 1988) and 
shareholder (Heath, 2006) theorists revolve around the question who should have a ‘voice’ 
(Hirschman, 1970) in corporate decision-making. Likewise, the considerations on input 
legitimacy identified by Scharpf (1999) and Mena and Palazzo (2012) in effect amount to 
concerns regarding statutory procedures. 
As organizations in modern societies are characterized by a significant variety of statutory 
procedures, we emphasize that, in general, it should not be assumed that organizational 
statutory procedures need to be democratic in order to be considered legitimate. Habermas 
(1996: 39-40), for example, recognized that, for a variety of reasons, it will often be 
considered legitimate for some executive functions of the State, as well as for other kinds of 
organizations, to be governed in more bureaucratic and hierarchical than democratic fashions. 
However, as MSIs tend to emphasize the importance of consensus in their various activities, 
the suggestion that an MSI’s statutory procedures are insufficiently democratic is thought to 
be particularly harmful (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).  
Mechanisms. Mechanisms refer to the manner by which an organization seeks to achieve 
its objectives. The literature divides the mechanisms by which MSIs seek to achieve their 
objectives into two broad categories: ‘strong/hard’ versus ‘weak/soft’. ‘Strong’ or ‘hard’ MSIs 
are those that construct rules, and that seek to maximize compliance with norms and “impose 
real obligations on firms” (Berliner & Prakash, 2012: 156). They often enforce relatively 
stringent compliance and auditing procedures, and are commonly associated with externally 
monitored and certified labeling schemes that enable the outputs associated with them to be 
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distinguished from those that are not: e.g., fair trade from non-fair trade coffee, FSC certified 
from non-FSC certified timber (Mena & Palazzo, 2012). The ‘strict father’ analogy quickly 
communicates the mechanism of strong or hard MSIs (Haack & Scherer, 2014).  ‘Weak’ or 
‘soft’ MSIs encourage learning and best practice approaches to achieving the objectives they 
endorse. They provide relatively few means by which the achievement of their principles 
might be enforced (Berliner & Prakash, 2012; Mena & Palazzo, 2012). Analogically, they 
have been referred to as the ‘nurturing parent’ model (Haack & Scherer, 2014). 
Soft MSIs, and the UNGC in particular, have often been criticized for being little more 
than public relations exercises that enable participants to derive reputational benefits at little 
or no operational cost (Berliner & Prakash, 2012; Sethi & Schepers, 2014). The supporters of 
such MSIs, however, posit that softness can actually be a strength: it can enable participants 
to be “self-disciplined and self-reliant citizens” (Haack & Scherer, 2014: 231) with genuine 
commitment. Supporters of soft MSIs have also suggested that the utility of hard MSIs can be 
undermined by encouraging their participants toward insincere or perfunctory compliance 
with the MSIs’ rules and principles (Ruggie, 2002). Such debates amount to the 
appropriateness and quality of the means by which MSIs seek to achieve their objectives and 
can give rise to critique that harms their legitimacy in the case they are perceived as 
perfunctory.  
Objectives. Objectives refer to the aims that MSIs profess to achieve, to the problems that 
they claim to help resolve. Although the formulation of objectives provides an MSI with its 
raison d’être, the fact that an MSI’s objectives can be criticized, and potentially harm its 
legitimacy, has received surprisingly limited attention. 
One exception is provided by Levy, Reinecke & Manning (2016: 381), who referred to 
conflicts over whether or not Fairtrade coffee MSIs should have the objective of advancing “a 
new economic order” or of enabling “‘poverty reduction’ and ‘sustainable development’”. 
 Page 11 of 53 
Fransen (2011) provides another exception when he showed that there have long been debates 
as to whether or not the objectives of labor rights MSIs should be more closely aligned with 
relative standards (such as expressed in national laws) or with universal standards (such as 
expressed in international standards). More generally, there continues to be relatively 
widespread concern that the social and environmental standards that MSIs commonly profess 
to advance, may result in the undermining of the ‘narrower’ and more immediate concerns of 
economic development (Jerbi, 2009). 
As these discussions demonstrate, legitimacy conflicts that involve MSIs, and other 
organizations as well, can relate to one or more of three organizational elements: i.e., their 
statutory procedures, their mechanisms, and their objectives. The differentiation of these 
three elements is important because it can help unravel the underlying grounds for legitimacy 
critiques. Moreover, it can help us to better understand organizational responses to such 
critiques, and thus move us towards a fuller understanding of how legitimacy critiques play 
out over time.  
METHODS  
Approach  
Our longitudinal case study relates to a conflict between two activist NGOs: Investors 
Against Genocide (IAG) and the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 
(SOMO), and the organizations responsible for managing and directing the UNGC: the 
Global Compact Office (GCO) and its Board. The conflict concerned the controversial 
Sudanese operations of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the parent company 
of UNCG member PetroChina. In short, IAG and SOMO wanted the GCO to pressurize 
CNPC/PetroChina into convincing the Sudanese State to end its suppression of the people in 
Darfur. The conflict is a distinct episode in a broader and longer lasting set of efforts by 
activist groups around the world in support of the people of Darfur. Nevertheless, it is not this 
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broader conflict that is of interest here, but the much more specific conflict that the activist 
NGOs initiated against the UNGC, and that ultimately resulted in the GCO and its Board 
unexpectedly employing the deflation response. 
The unexpected nature of this response became apparent during our initial investigations 
of the conflict. Therefore, we decided to explore it further, believing that the extant literature 
might be ‘incomplete’ (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) and therefore in need of further theory 
development (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). In building on our theory section, we further 
specified our question for empirical research: How did the challenging organizations, IAG 
and SOMO, and the targeted organization, UNGC, make use of the UNGC’s statutory 
procedures, mechanisms and objectives in creating and respectively responding to their 
conflict over the UNGC’s legitimacy?  
Informed by our reading of the literature and by our evolving understanding of the case, 
we expected that our analysis could shed light on the management and handling of this 
legitimacy conflict by the UNGC, which we came to conceive as a deflation response. 
Although case studies are limited in not allowing for the assessment of the prevalence of a 
phenomenon, or for precisely predicting antecedents that lead to the phenomenon (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007), they can be very useful in exploring theoretical arguments with relevance 
beyond the case at hand (Siggelkow, 2007). In short, having completed our analysis and 
discussion, we believe our approach has allowed us to understand the UNGC’s surprising 
response to this externally initiated legitimacy conflict as an instance of deflation. 
Data collection and analysis 
The case analysis builds on archival materials that are publicly accessible through the 
Internet. Our use of archival materials has the advantage of being nonreactive and 
unobtrusive (Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer, 2007). These qualities are particularly important for 
analyzing controversial topics, because they help avoid all the problems associated with 
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gathering data from informants that likely have a keen interest in being perceived by the 
researcher in a certain light (Alvesson, 2003). We entered combinations of keywords, such as 
Sudan, Darfur, CNPC, PetroChina, UNGC, SOMO and IAG, in various major Internet search 
engines (Google, Bing) to retrieve relevant documents, and checked if hyperlinks in them 
might disclose further relevant information. Unsurprisingly, a majority of the documents we 
found originated from websites maintained by IAG and UNGC, the central players in the 
conflict. Several documents, such as press statements issued by these protagonists, were 
regularly re-published on multiple other websites, thereby creating redundancy in primary 
materials. We decided to use the original rather than the reposted documents. The set of 
documents thus compiled allowed us to gain an in-depth understanding of the case, including 
its context and key events in the case history. Altogether, they comprise approximately 200 
A4 pages of text, including press releases, formal letters, blog entries, board meeting reports, 
public statements, and newspaper articles. We focused on data that directly related to both 
PetroChina (or CNPC) and the UNGC. 
We started our qualitative, longitudinal case study by identifying in our data set all the 
events that pertain to the conflict. Events are the building blocks of process studies (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 2005); they comprise the appearance, disappearance, or change of entities (such 
as agents, interventions, states of affairs, or external shocks) in relation to, and of 
consequence for, a process of interest. In identifying events, we looked for agents, their 
interventions, and their positions vis-à-vis the conflict. Altogether, we identified 30 events 
through which the conflict evolved. Table 1 chronologically lists and briefly describes these 
events and the sources through which we identified them.  
– Insert Table 1 about here –  
Our subsequent analysis of these 30 events comprised three steps. First, we identified 
whether each event was associated with a supportive or a critical stance towards the UNGC 
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(‘Stance’, Tables 1 and 3). ‘Supportive’ means that the general tone of the source material 
discusses UNGC in a positive light: e.g., by expressing satisfaction with the UNGC’s 
approach. By contrast, ‘critical’ means that the general tone of the source material is negative. 
In such instances, the source material sometimes demanded, more or less explicitly, that the 
UNGC needed to make some sort of change to its policies or operations. This first coding 
step is important in the context of analyzing conflict, because it helps explicate that such texts 
are produced deliberately, and that they seek to influence the conflict’s outcome. For 
example, Event 27 is the publication of an interview with Georg Kell, the then Executive 
Director of the UNGC. In this interview, Kell seeks to bolster the validity of the UNGC by 
pointing out that it ‘delists’ member companies that use the Global Compact for PR purposes 
only. Thus, Event 27 is clearly supportive of the UNGC. This first step was straightforward as 
most of the events relate to documents authored either by the UNGC and agents acting on 
their behalf, or by its antagonists. 
In the second step, and in light of our review of the literature, we developed a set of 
coding guidelines to capture our three elements of statutory procedures, mechanisms and 
objectives (see Table 2), and conducted a pilot analysis to confirm that these three elements 
are indeed important to make sense of our case (Eisenhardt, 1989). The coding guidelines 
made coders identify whether or not a given event was explicitly associated with a supportive 
or a critical position on the UNGC’s statutory procedures, mechanisms or objectives (the 
‘value’ dimension in Table 2). A ‘critical’ position on the UNGC’s objectives, for example, 
could manifest in the form of comments suggesting that UNGC’s participants do not comply 
with its human rights principles, or in the form of a statement suggesting that the UNGC’s 
human rights principles were somehow being ‘watered down’. By way of contrast, a 
‘supportive’ position on the UNGC’s objectives could suggest that the UNGC’s participants 
generally adhere to its human rights principles, or that the UNGC’s principles are consistent 
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with more general understandings of human rights. The coding guidelines made the coders 
further identify whether or not an event was explicitly associated with a (desired or 
effectuated) change to the GCO’s statutory procedures, mechanisms or objectives (the 
‘dynamics’ dimension in Table 2). If, for example, a source document suggested that the 
GCO was considering some sort of change to its objectives (e.g., to its human rights 
principles), then this would result in the source being coded as ‘change’. If, on the other hand, 
the source document referred to its objectives, and made no reference of any prior or potential 
change, then it would be coded as ‘stable’. 
In the third step, two of the authors independently coded all 30 events following the thus 
developed guidelines. Their initial efforts resulted in 86% of coded elements being agreed 
upon (165 of 192). They resolved their disagreement on the remaining 27 elements through 
deliberation, assessing the validity of their respective evidence and arguments for their 
particular choices and agreeing on the most plausible interpretation as the final coding. 
Following this process of weighing arguments, the authors were able to agree on the coding 
of all the events (Table 3). On this basis, we were able to identify key patterns and points of 
development during the conflict episode, and thus to complete our analysis of the antagonists’ 
critique and the UNGC’s response in terms of the UNGC’s objectives, mechanisms and 
statutory procedures.  
– Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here –  
Case actors and context 
The UNGC and Global Compact Office. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, on 
January 31, 1999, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed that “you, the 
business leaders gathered in Davos, and we, the UN, initiate a global compact of shared 
values and principles, which will give a human face to the global market” (United Nations, 
1999: 1). Subsequently launched on July 26, 2000, the objective of the UNGC is to 
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“contribute to a more stable, equitable, and inclusive process of globalization” (Kell & Levin, 
2003: 162). To do so, the “Global Compact engages the private sector to collaborate with the 
United Nations – in partnership with global labor, NGOs, and academia – to identify and 
spread good corporate practices in the areas of human rights, labor rights, protection of the 
environment, and anticorruption” (Rasche, 2009: 513). With over 12,000 signatories 
including 8,000 business firms (as of March 7, 2017), the UNGC is arguably the world’s 
largest multi-stakeholder initiative to advance corporate sustainability.  
The GCO is responsible for managing the UNGC. Georg Kell was its director from 2000 
to 2015, i.e. the period our case analysis covers. The GCO is endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly. The UN Secretary General chairs the Global Compact Board and has the right to 
appoint its other members (UNGC website). The Board provides strategic advice and 
recommendations to the GCO and “is comprised of four constituency groups — business, 
civil society, labour and the United Nations” (UNGC website). As of 2014, there were 27 
members of the Global Compact Board, 17 of which were from the business constituency.1 
Following a proposal for “broader ownership” of the UNGC (2005: 1-2), the non-profit 
Foundation for the Global Compact (FFGC) was established (FFGC website). The FFGC’s 
“sole purpose is to mobilize funding from participants to support the growth of the Global 
Compact. Its small board is chaired by Sir Mark Moody Stuart [former chairman of Royal 
Dutch Shell] who has been a champion and steward of the Global Compact since its 
inception” (UNGC, 2008: 6). Whereas the GCO still receives funds from countries in the 
UNGC ‘Government Donor Group’2, by 2012, corporate funding through the FFGC had risen 
to almost 80% of its income ($US 12,7 million). The UNGC’s prior “self-imposed rule not to 
                                                          
1 Current membership of the Board can be found at the UNGC’s website. 
2 Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
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accept corporate funding for Global Compact activities” (Kell & Levin, 2003: 170) has thus 
become void, with relatively significant amounts of corporate funding now being received. 
As the above indicates, the UNGC has already undergone various changes (Kell, 2012). 
With the present case, we focus on changes that the GCO and its Board initiated in response 
to the challenge that IAG and SOMO, with the support of more than 80 ‘signatories’, 
presented in their critical letter to UNGC Executive Director Georg Kell on May 12, 2008 
(Table 1, Event 1).3 
The Antagonists. Founded in 2006, IAG is a project of the Massachusetts Coalition to 
Save Darfur: “a collaboration of faith-based and secular organizations and concerned 
individuals working together to raise awareness and help address the problems in Darfur, 
Sudan” (MCTSD website). IAG is a single-issue activist NGO with the goal of convincing 
“financial institutions to make a commitment that they will not invest in genocide” (IAG, 
website).  
SOMO, founded in 1973, presents itself as “an independent, non-profit research and 
network organization working on social, ecological and economic issues related to 
sustainable development” (SOMO, website). SOMO receives funding from the Dutch 
government and the European Commission, among other donors, and provides commissioned 
research that aims at exerting influence over multinational companies on sustainable 
development matters (SOMO, 2013: 9). SOMO promotes ‘hard’ solutions to business-society 
problems (SOMO, website). In this manner, SOMO maintained the Global Compact Critics 
Blog (operational to the end of the conflict in 2015; Table 1, Event 30) to “gather and share 
information about the Global Compact, partnerships between the United Nations and 
companies, and corporate accountability” (GCCB website). 
                                                          
3 As only one of the 80 Signatories is a UNGC participant, the conflict constitutes an external 
legitimacy conflict. 
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CNPC/PetroChina. Although not central to the MSI conflict itself, it is important that we 
also provide some summary remarks regarding CNPC/PetroChina and their role in Sudan, as 
their activities provided the motivation for the antagonists to challenge the UNGC. CNPC 
was created in 1997 following a restructuring of China’s oil and petrochemical industry 
(Zhang, 2004: 101-104). In April 2000, a significant subsidiary of CNPC, PetroChina, “was 
listed on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges. The initial public offering … raised 
$2.89 billion” (Zhang, 2004: 115). PetroChina is also listed on the Shanghai stock exchange; 
nevertheless, 86.01% of PetroChina’s stocks continue to be owned by CNPC (PetroChina, 
2017: 10). CNPC, in its turn, is 100% owned by the Chinese State (CNPC, 2013: 5) which is 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Through these ownership structures, 
CNPC/PetroChina can be thought of as an instrument for the strategic interests of the Chinese 
State and the CCP.  
In many ways, CNPC and PetroChina are ‘one and the same’ company. Indeed, leading 
personnel, resources, and projects, are commonly shared between them. So too is their 
concern with the CCP’s domestic (Shambaugh, 2008) and foreign (Chan, Lee & Chan, 2008) 
policies. Nevertheless, there are also differences between CNPC and PetroChina. In 
particular, CNPC operates in Sudan, whereas the UNGC member PetroChina does not. 
Arguably, the CCP put the Sudanese assets “in the hands of CNPC … rather than … 
PetroChina … to increase flexibility and reduce potential shareholder pressure” (Lieberthal & 
Herberg, 2006: 18). 
CNPC started its oil business in Sudan in 1995, taking over part of the concessions of 
Western oil companies that were forced to divest from the country when Sudan was added to 
the US list of ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ in 1993. Although there are other key players in 
the Sudanese oil industry, CNPC is the largest among them (Kienzler, 2012). In this light, and 
as “more than 70 percent of the [Sudanese] government’s share of oil profits is spent on 
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defense” (Gettleman, 2006), CNPC was regularly accused of providing the Sudanese State 
with the financial means to perpetuate genocide in Darfur (Kienzler, 2012).4  
ANALYSIS 
Since 2003, the Sudanese government has been accused of repressing the population of the 
Darfur region – a genocide according to many commentators (Hagan, Rymond-Richmond & 
Parker, 2005; Strauss, 2005). Following suit, a global network of activist groups, including 
IAG and SOMO, sought to convince the Sudanese government to stop its repression. Given 
this context, IAG and SOMO were surprised that PetroChina – whose parent company, 
CNPC, has been accused of helping fund genocide in Darfur (see above) – had become a 
member of the UNGC. Consequently, IAG and SOMO tried to use the UNGC’s own 
procedures and complaint mechanism to make the GCO pressure CNPC into using its 
influence to encourage the Sudanese government to put an end to its campaigns in Darfur. To 
that end, IAG and SOMO first sent a letter to the GCO that was co-signed by 80 other 
organizations in May 2008. As is clear from our data, the subsequent conflict was 
characterized by a critically charged exchange of letters and public statements between 
IAG/SOMO and GCO. It was of clear concern to the GCO and its Board. In this section, we 
analyze the UNGC’s response to the challenge in terms of its mechanisms, statutory 
procedures, and objectives.  
The UNGC’s Mechanisms 
Based on Table 3 we observe that, whilst the UNGC’s mechanisms were criticized at both the 
beginning and end of the conflict (Events 1 & 30, Table 3, mechanisms>value), the conflict 
did not result in the UNGC’s mechanisms being changed (mechanisms>dynamics). Indeed, 
the only other instances at which mechanisms were a point of focus during the conflict were 
                                                          
4 The recent history of Sudan, including the Darfur crisis, has been covered in publications 
such as Gallab (2008), Gettleman (2006), Johnson (2007), and Patey (2007). 
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when Hugh Williamson of the Financial Times published an article that was critical of the 
UNGC’s role in emerging economies (Event 19), and when the UN’s independent oversight 
body, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), released a report that was very critical of the UNGC’s 
overall role and functioning (Event 20).  
Given how much discussion there is of MSI mechanisms in general, and those of the 
UNGC in particular (e.g., Haack & Scherer, 2014; Rasche, 2009; Ruggie, 2002), we were 
initially surprised that the UNGC’s mechanisms had not played a more significant role during 
the conflict. We were also quite surprised that several of the Events that were characterized 
by their critical stance toward the UNGC were coded as being supportive of the UNGC’s 
mechanisms. Whilst unexpected, we came to interpret this ‘support’ as a tactical move by the 
antagonists: as an attempt by the antagonists to force the UNGC to substantiate its 
longstanding claim that its ‘soft’ regulatory mechanism is effective (e.g., Kell, 2003, 2005).  
Substantiating this claim would have required that the UNGC took its stated objectives 
seriously and followed its own statutory procedures. As the UNGC did not proceed to ‘walk 
their talk’ in these ways, however, SOMO, in particular, took the conflict’s outcomes as yet 
further evidence of the weakness, ineffectiveness, and ultimate futility, of the UNGC’s soft 
mechanisms. Thus, and further to beginning the conflict in 2008 by criticizing the UNGC’s 
“lack of effective monitoring and enforcement” mechanisms (Event 1), SOMO ended the 
conflict in 2015 by noting that, whilst it would no longer update their Global Compact Critics 
Blog, it would nevertheless “continue to monitor the (in)effectiveness of voluntary corporate 
responsibility guidelines and initiatives” whilst prioritising “its work on contributing to the 
development of internationally binding and enforceable instruments” (Event 30).5 
                                                          
5 IAG has likewise acknowledged that their campaign has ended. As of April 18 2019, their 
website continues to note that: “Investors Against Genocide engaged extensively with the UN 
Global Compact regarding PetroChina. Ultimately, that engagement failed. Investors Against 
Genocide is no longer engaging the UNGC”. 
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The UNGC’s Statutory Procedures 
As the antagonists recognized, the UNGC’s Integrity Measures provided a means by which 
external parties might seek to impact upon the UNGC’s functioning and decision making, and 
thus comprise a key element of the UNGC’s statutory procedures. In particular, the 
antagonists noted that their “concerns fall under Measure Four of the GC Integrity Measures: 
‘Allegations of Systematic or Egregious Abuses.’ In this measure, the GC states that 
‘safeguarding the reputation, integrity and good efforts of the Global Compact and its 
participants requires transparent means to handle credible allegations of systematic or 
egregious abuse of the GC’s overall aims and principles’” (Event 1). 
The allegation that the antagonists advanced under this measure was that 
CNPC/PetroChina was systematically and egregiously abusing UNGC Principles 1 and 2. 
Principles 1 and 2 respectively state that businesses “should support and respect the 
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights,” and that businesses should ensure 
“that they are not complicit in human rights abuses” (Event 1). In seeking to use Measure 
Four of the UNGC’s Integrity Measures, the antagonists were initially supportive of it. In 
subsequent correspondence, however, they came to express their frustration at what they 
perceived as both CNPC/PetroChina’s and the GCO’s failure to take their claims seriously 
(Events 4-6) (Table 3, statutory procedures>value). 
In responding to this expressed dissatisfaction, Kell (Event 8) and Moody-Stuart (Event 
10) emphasized that the Integrity Measures could not be applied to CNPC as CNPC was not a 
member of the UNGC. Moody-Stuart (Event 10), however, also indicated that UNGC would 
soon revisit these measures. Hence, the Global Compact Board held a meeting on 24 July 
2009 at which they reviewed progress on their Integrity Measures and agreed that there was a 
need for “clarification of what the integrity measures are and are not through a set of 
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‘frequently asked questions’ (FAQs)” (Event 12). At this instance, we observe the seed for the 
deflation of the UNGC’s statutory procedures (Table 3, statutory procedures>dynamics).  
In particular, the FAQs stated that the “main vehicle” for safeguarding “the integrity and 
good efforts of the UN, its Global Compact, participants and stakeholders” is not the UNGC’s 
Integrity Measure relating to Allegations of Systematic or Egregious Abuses – as one would 
expect in light of the critique by IAG and SOMO – but rather its “Policy on Communicating 
Progress” (Event 12). This policy “requires every participant to share on an annual basis with 
their stakeholders their progress in implementing the Global Compact principles” (Event 12). 
Moreover, the FAQs emphasize that “when the Global Compact receives information 
suggesting that a participant company is not committed to continuous improvement, the 
Global Compact will endeavor to encourage dialogue between the company concerned and 
those who have raised the concerns.” Nevertheless, the FAQs also note that if a “company 
provides a plausible rationale for its refusal” to “respond in writing” to such concerns, the 
GCO can let the matter be (Event 12). 
In addition to all this, the notes to the July 24, 2009, Board meeting (Event 12) reveal that: 
As for the timing and extent of information released publicly on matters raised [through 
the Integrity Measure relating to Allegations of Systematic or Egregious Abuses], the 
Board did not reach a concrete conclusion, recognizing that this was a complex 
situation, with factors to be considered including ensuring appropriate time to 
understand the facts, guarding against public grandstanding and navigating other 
sensitivities. 
 
The UNGC eventually updated its Integrity Measures in April 2011. In line with the 
preceding developments, this document stated that the GCO can “use its judgement to filter 
out prima facie frivolous allegations” (Event 24).6 In other words, the UNGC reserved the 
right to dismiss, without further ado, any allegations by external parties as ‘frivolous’ and as 
                                                          
6 In June 2016, after the conflict had ended, the UNGC published another update of its 
integrity measures. In this version, there is longer reference to ‘frivolous allegations’ but the 
tone and direction remain highly similar to the earlier versions of the integrity measures. 
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exemplifying instances of ‘public grandstanding’. It thus made it much more difficult for 
external parties to hold the UNGC accountable for its policies and practices.  
In addition to the above, the UNGC also changed the composition of its Board by 
strengthening its business faction, thereby further compromising its claimed inclusivity and 
representativeness. Specifically, in May 2011, two members of the CCP with overlapping 
interests to those of CNPC/PetroChina were appointed to the UNGC Board: Mr. Fu Chengyu, 
Chairman of Sinopec Group, and Mr. Li Decheng of the China Enterprise Confederation 
(Events 25 and 26). This was much to the disappointment of the antagonists, because they 
expected that these appointments would reinforce the position of PetroChina within the 
Global Compact.  
In general, then, the UNGC deflated its statutory procedures by making them less 
inclusive and less transparent (Mena & Palazzo, 2012: 537-540). Rather than positively 
responding to the antagonists’ concerns, the GCO and its Board increased their own 
discretion when it came to adjudicating upon, and releasing information about, future 
allegations of systematic or egregious abuse. These changes are inconsistent with the 
UNGC’s long-standing emphasis on the importance of making globalization more inclusive, 
and thus constitute a deflation of the UNGC’s statutory procedures. 
The UNGC’s Objectives  
Since the very start, the UNGC’s mission has been to help business align its practices with 
human rights and labor rights, and help promote sustainability (United Nations, 1999). 
Having subsequently added anti-corruption concerns to its mission, the UNGC now has 10 
principles that UNGC participants are meant to “incorporate into their strategies, policies and 
procedures” (UNGC, website). As has already been indicated, the UNGC’s objectives relating 
to Principles 1 and 2 – which respectively state that businesses “should support and respect 
the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights,” and that businesses should ensure 
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“that they are not complicit in human rights abuses” (Event 1) – were central to the 
antagonists’ decision to initiate the conflict.  
Indeed, the fundamental concern the antagonists had throughout the conflict was that 
CNPC/PetroChina was abusing these two principles given their connection to the Sudanese 
government (e.g., Event 1). This charge represented a very significant legitimacy threat to the 
UNGC, and the documented evidence suggests that the GCO and Board faced serious 
difficulties in responding to it.  
Event 8 marks the first attempt at formulating a meaningful response, with Kell noting that 
the UNGC takes “the issue of business and its role in conflict and peace very seriously” and 
that there are plans afoot “to embark on a study into the trade-offs between engagement and 
divestment.” Following this, Moody-Stuart (Event 10) noted that whilst there “are many 
different views” on withdrawal or divestment from countries given human rights concerns, he 
was not “in general favour of” it. Moody-Stuart also acknowledged that the “United Nations 
Global Compact does not currently have any guidance for business on the issue of whether 
and, if so, how to engage in human rights advocacy with a government” (Event 10). 
In following on from these prior steps, which appear to have been relatively defensive and 
evasive, the UNGC began to elaborate on them at a Board meeting in 2009 (Event 12). As the 
antagonists lamented, the GCO and its Board used this meeting to propose that Principles 1 
and 2 did not require that CNPC/PetroChina “use its influence to ask the Sudanese 
Government to pursue specific actions linked to peace building” (Event 13). Following on 
from this, the UNGC published a Good Practice Note on ‘How Business Can Encourage 
Governments to Fulfil their Human Rights Obligations’ in March 2010 (Event 15). Here it 
was emphasized that “when faced with a human rights situation, companies may initially 
consider inaction or divestment/disinvestment the only courses of action, however … there is 
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a wide spectrum of opportunities through which business can engage with government on 
human rights issues” (Event 15).  
In conjunction with John Ruggie, the then UN Special Representative on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, the UNGC 
emphasized that they did not characterize public policy advocacy as being part of businesses 
duty to respect human rights; but rather, as part of the voluntary contributions to support 
human rights (Event 16). The general importance of the distinction is the stipulation that 
complicity in human rights abuses does not emerge through “mere presence in a country, 
paying taxes, or silence in the face of abuses” (Ruggie, 2008: para 77). With regard to the 
present case, the importance of this distinction is in its implication that CNPC/PetroChina is 
not morally obliged to pressure the Sudanese government to play a more positive role with 
regard to ending the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Whilst not being explicit on the point, it 
appears that the UNGC would consider such engagement in “matters of foreign policy” 
(Event 12) an act of supererogation at best (Event 18). The emphasis on this technical 
distinction was a dismal and somewhat confusing result for the antagonists, who noted that 
the “Global Compact Office has [previously] acknowledged that... ‘respect and support for 
human rights are often closely interlinked in [practical] terms’” (Event 17).  
The basic point is that by differentiating between an organization’s obligation to ‘respect’ 
human rights and an organizations voluntary choice to ‘support’ human rights, and by 
associating human rights advocacy with the latter, the UNGC deflated its objectives regarding 
human rights.7 In doing so, the UNGC followed Ruggie (2008: 65-72) in adopting a form of 
                                                          
7 Another stance would have been possible for the UNGC. For example, the Dutch Pension 
giant ABP argued, when it divested from PetroChina in 2012, that an apparent unwillingness 
to support human rights is inconsistent with UNGC Principles 1 and 2 (IAG, 2012). 
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“human rights minimalism” that makes supporting (or protecting) human rights a choice 
rather than an obligation (Wettstein, 2012: 741-745).  
DISCUSSION 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated the utility of analytically differentiating between an 
MSI’s statutory procedures, mechanisms and objectives in legitimacy conflicts. In 
supplementing prior work on the UNGC in particular, which has largely focused on the 
legitimacy of the UNGC’s mechanisms (e.g., Berliner & Prakash, 2012; Haack & Scherer, 
2014; Rasche, 2009; Sethi & Schepers, 2014), it has shown that legitimacy conflicts can also 
relate to statutory procedures and objectives. 
Legitimacy conflicts typically focus on a perceived or actual discrepancy between some 
agent’s professed and actual policies and practices. Conflict arises when the (high) levels of 
ambition expressed in professed policies are not met through the (low levels of) actual 
practices. When this occurs, an organization can be accused of hypocrisy or of lacking 
integrity, and thus have its pragmatic or moral legitimacy undermined (Suchman, 1995). 
Hitherto, the literature has suggested that organizations that are confronted with such 
legitimacy threats can respond through decoupling or moral entrapment. The case we have 
analyzed suggests that deflation is a third generic response, fundamentally different from 
decoupling and moral entrapment, to externally constructed legitimacy critiques. 
Deflation differs from the longstanding recognition that organizations can employ a 
decoupling strategy (e.g., Jamali, 2010) that results in their keeping their actual policies and 
practices at a level of ambition that is relatively lower than the ambition that they have 
previously professed, and continue to profess (Figure 1, decoupling). Deflation also differs 
from the ‘moral entrapment’ strategy (Haack, et al., 2012; Haack & Scherer, 2014) which 
results in organizations lifting their actual policies and practices upwards, so as to make them 
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consistent with the relatively high standard of promises that they have previously professed, 
and continue to profess (Figure 1, moral entrapment).  
In contrast to these two strategies, then, our analysis has revealed that the GCO and Board 
resolved the discrepancy between their professed and actual policies and practices by 
lowering their professed policies and practices, thus bringing them in line with their 
previously and currently actualized policies and practices (Figure 1, deflation). In the 
remainder of the discussion, we discuss whether deflation is a unique phenomenon and why 
organizations might resort to deflation in response to legitimacy critique.  
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
A Unique Phenomenon? 
We posit that deflation, as a theoretical concept, is clearly distinct from concepts in three 
potentially related literatures.  
First, the downward adjustment of a standard, as seen in the case of UNGC, could – 
perhaps – be interpreted and understood as a renegotiation of an internal rule as per Strauss’s 
(1978) negotiated order theory or Reynaud’s (1989, 1995) theory of social regulation. On this 
interpretation, the UNGC’s formulation of its statutory procedures and objectives is a form of 
‘control regulation’ that comprises a guide for action. Irrespective of the question as to 
whether PetroChina’s ‘self-regulation’ complies with the UNGC’s control regulation, the 
challenge that IAG and SOMO pose to the UNGC arguably made the GCO, its Board, and 
PetroChina (and perhaps other UNGC members, too), realize that the UNGC’s control 
regulation was no longer adequate. Hence, it might be thought that these parties renegotiated 
the regulation to the reported outcome among themselves; and there was no involving of IAG, 
SOMO, or any other external party.  
Such an explanation, however, would be a stretch of Strauss’ and Reynaud’s theories. It 
would involve a clear change of context from a traditional, hierarchical organization, to a 
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meta-organization (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008). It would also entail a shift in the impetus for 
negotiating the regulation, from internal dynamics between managers and employees to 
dynamics instigated by an external party that is not involved in the renegotiation. On this 
basis, we believe that the dynamics around the deflationary response might be understood as 
constituting an extension to Strauss’s and Reynaud’s theorizing.8 
Second, deflation might also be conceived in terms of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) 
economies of worth perspective. Taupin’s (2012) analysis of credit rating agencies, for 
example, built on this body of work to identify different activities aimed at “institutional 
maintenance”, including “confirmation work in which the actors repeat or reformulate the 
existing regulatory arrangement or simply refuse to take part in the debate” (Taupin, 2012: 
529). He also noted that actors can engage in qualifying objects according to an existing 
concept of regulation, or they can agree to disagree and thus maintain the status quo. On this 
basis, Taupin (2012: 533) points to the notion of ‘compromise’ which “makes it possible to 
find a way to live together despite insurmountable oppositions.” In a way, deflation might be 
seen as a form of compromise since regulations are brought in line with practices, giving up 
on some of the professed policies and practices. Yet, as the antagonists in our case were not 
involved in the reformulation of the regulatory arrangements, this explanation does not hold: 
compromise requires some mutual agreement. 
Third, the notion of ‘mission drift’ might also be seen to describe the phenomenon we 
have here analyzed. According to Grimes et al., (2017: 3), mission drift occurs when an 
audience perceives a discontinuity between an organization’s action and its perception of 
what is central and distinctive about the organization: the organization’s image. More 
                                                          
8 We are grateful to one of our Reviewers for having attended us to Strauss’ and Reynaud’s 
theories of negotiated order and social regulation. 
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specifically, Grimes et al, (2017) propose that, in responding to an audience’s perception of 
such mission drift, organizations will initially be inclined to respond through impression 
management practices. If such impression management practices turn out to be unsuccessful, 
then these organizations will be inclined to resort to governance-related efforts to repair the 
connection between an organization’s image and its action. In the language of this paper, 
impression management is exemplary of decoupling, of actively creating or maintaining a 
discrepancy between image and action. On the other hand, governance-related changes that 
seek “to improve the coordinating function of the organization to demonstrate strides toward 
high consistency” (Grimes et al., 2017: 37), as well as other structural changes designed to 
signal that the organization is responsive to the audience’s concerns, are exemplary of moral 
entrapment. Given these points, we conclude that deflation, as defined and discussed in this 
paper, has not yet been identified by works focused on mission drift, economies of worth, 
negotiated orders or social regulation.  
Whilst we believe that our study has identified a relevant novel concept, we do not make 
any claims to its prevalence. Having said that, and as the deployment of a deflationary 
response may seem a rare event, we note that a recent case involving FIFA, the International 
Federation of Football Associations, suggests it is not unique. On August 12, 2018, FIFA 
published a revision of its code of ethics. AP News reported on the revision with the 
subheading “FIFA has officially eradicated corruption [from its code of ethics]. All it took 
was pressing the delete key.” In short, and in light of a history of well publicized allegations 
of misconduct that have threatened its integrity, it appears that FIFA has deflated its 
objectives by removing the mentioning of ‘corruption’ from its code of ethics. Moreover, it 
appears that it has also deflated its statutory procedures by introducing a defamation clause to 
make it more difficult for those bound by the FIFA code of ethics to raise concerns regarding 
corrupt practices. FIFA in turn argues that this is mainly a matter of translation in different 
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working languages used by the organization.9 Similar to the case of the UNGC, FIFA’s 
employment of the deflation response has gone largely unnoted, which indicates that in these 
instances at least it has been a success. 
Why Deflation? 
Whatever one thinks of the moral worth of their doing so, the GCO and its Board employed a 
deflationary response to a legitimacy critique. By deflating their statutory principles, they 
reduced the possibility for moral deliberation with challengers; and by deflating their 
objectives they reduced the risk of being accused of mission drift, lack of integrity, hypocrisy, 
and so on. In this fashion, the GCO has reduced the likelihood of propriety-legitimacy 
critiques (Bitektine & Haack, 2015) being raised. As a result, it appears to have reduced the 
likelihood of critical external parties vociferously creating a “mental alarm” (Tost, 2011) that 
would prompt other stakeholders to revisit their own propriety judgments, and that could act 
to “erode the perception of consensus around [the UNGC’s] validity” (Bitektine & Haack, 
2015: 59). Of course, external critics remain free to raise their concerns regarding the UNGC 
in various other arenas of citizenship (Whelan, Moon & Grant, 2013), but the GCO and 
Board has apparently sought to ensure that the UNGC’s statutory procedures do not 
encourage any critical ‘public grandstanding’ within those arenas that they themselves 
directly control. 
Yet, the question still arises as to why an MSI or another organization would employ a 
deflationary response? For now, we can only speculate about the conditions under which 
deflation may occur – our data do not reveal the underlying motives of the UNGC. 
                                                          
9 “Keep bribes quiet for 10 years, FIFA won’t punish you” (Harris, 2018a).  In spite of FIFA’s 
(2018) denial of the charge, our own comparisons of the 2012 and the revised 2018 versions 
of the FIFA’s ethical codes show that Harris’ report seems largely correct (e.g. sections on 
‘Limitation period’, ‘Offering and accepting gifts and other benefits’, ‘Commission’, ‘Non-
discrimination / Discrimination and defamation’, new section on ‘Plea bargain (application of 
sanctions by mutual consent)’) (see also Harris, 2018b). 
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Nevertheless, work by Bitektine and Haack (2015) points to it being informed by a belief that 
any critical claim, irrespective of whether or not it is well founded, can fracture the 
appearance of an organization’s validity. Such work likewise suggests that if the GCO and 
Board had complied with the demands of the antagonists, then they would have run the risk 
of such compliance being widely reported. Such reporting, in its turn, could have then 
encouraged other external critics to use the UNGC’s statutory procedures in a similar manner.  
On this basis, we propose that MSIs may sometimes sacrifice some democratic legitimacy 
by deflating their statutory procedures due to the belief that such a deflation can reduce the 
options for critical voices to threaten the MSI’s validity. This idea is related to Ashforth and 
Gibbs’ (1990: 177) suggestion that “attempts to increase legitimacy may trigger a series of 
vicious circles which ultimately decrease legitimacy.” Moreover, it can help explain why the 
UNGC, which very clearly emphasizes the importance of (consensual) collaboration and 
learning amongst its participants, seemingly wishes to avoid unsolicited collaboration or 
learning when it comes to its own objectives. 
In our reasoning about why MSIs might choose deflation in response to legitimacy 
critiques, we implicitly adopted an understanding of decision-makers in MSIs as calculative 
and rational (in economic, strategic and political terms). This fits the accounts that Whelan 
(2013), Scherer, Palazzo and Seidl (2013) and Oliver (1991), provided with regard to the 
costs and benefits associated with different organizational responses to external pressures and 
environmental demands. Following this reasoning, organizations will choose a deflationary 
response when that approach is associated with the greatest benefit (or the least costs) relative 
to alternatives (i.e., moral entrapment and decoupling). On the one hand, moral entrapment 
may lead to an external expectation of continuous improvement, which in turn may become 
(relatively) costly due to a need to match growing ambition levels among stakeholders. 
Decoupling, on the other hand, may be costly due to it potentially making organizations 
 Page 32 of 53 
vulnerable to exposure – which the availability of digital media has arguably made much 
easier – thus risking major legitimacy damage and associated costs. If both moral entrapment 
and decoupling are costly or risky, then deflation may appear an attractive alternative to a 
calculative decision-maker, even if this approach could also lend itself to the criticism of 
having insufficiently ambitious standards.  
A related consideration is the heterogeneity of environmental demands or external 
pressures, and the power and influence of the different actors voicing them (Marais, 2014; 
Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Whelan, 2013). When a broad section of society is 
univocal in its demands, when a particularly prominent or powerful actor is making them, or 
when the costs associated with complying with the demand are bearable, then an organization 
seems likely to employ the moral entrapment strategy. If one or more of these conditions are 
not met, then a targeted organization may increasingly be inclined towards decoupling and 
deflation strategies.  
In the case of the UNGC facing IAG and SOMO, it appears that these particular 
antagonists were relatively isolated (in spite of their ability to mobilize 80+ signatories – see 
Event 1) and powerless relative to other stakeholders in the UNGC. Such a situation would 
call for decoupling, especially if other major stakeholders do not demonstrate a strong interest 
in the issue. But, if other stakeholders do have a strong interest (e.g., certain states, other 
NGOs), and if the costs or risks associated with decoupling are high (den Hond et al., 2014), 
then deflation could be the least costly alternative. The fact that the GCO employed the 
deflation rather than decoupling response suggests that it might have felt unable to conceal 
any purported failings of either itself or its participants. It is, for example, difficult to imagine 
how links between CNPC/PetroChina and the Sudan government could have been concealed 
or denied. 
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By limiting the type of the human rights ‘demands’ it places on its participants, and by 
acting to limit the risk of ‘public grandstanding’, the GCO also appears to have secured the 
loyalty of its corporate participants and to have suggested to prospective participants that 
deflationary flexibility may also be exercised at later points in time if needed. As the UNGC 
is explicitly and increasingly reliant on funding from its participants (e.g. Kell & Levin, 
2003: 170; UNGC, 2008: 6), this move could well have been informed by a concern to make 
the UNGC’s principles consistent with the political and economic objectives of its (corporate) 
funders. The appointment of two CCP members to the Global Compact Board during the 
conflict (Event 25) lends further support to this suggestion. 
The GCO and Board did not deflate the UNGC’s mechanisms. This is not surprising, as in 
light of qualifications in the standards literature, the kind of ‘soft’ mechanisms that rely on 
learning through voluntary reporting, on which the UNGC is premised, are the least stringent 
mode by which MSIs can operate. The lack of deflation of mechanisms is therefore specific 
to this case as deflation of mechanisms certainly is conceivable. Indeed, the critique of the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) by FSC-Watch – that FSC made their mechanisms less 
stringent – is a case in point.10 
With such evidence and reasoning in mind, we propose that the GCO’s initially surprising 
response to the externally constructed legitimacy conflict starts to become explainable and 
understandable. Indeed, and as the recent example of FIFA also suggests, it seems likely that 
other MSIs, and organizations more generally, may occasionally deploy a deflationary 
response rather than a response consistent with moral entrapment or decoupling. Yet, it seems 
unlikely that organizations would be willing to go ‘on the record’ and explicitly acknowledge 
                                                          
10 FSC Watch (website) is “a group of people, FSC supporters and members among them, 
who are very concerned about the constant and serious erosion of the FSC’s reliability and 
thus credibility”. At several times the group pointed at how FSC, in their view, deflated its 
mechanisms, for instance in redefining and thereby weakening the ‘controlled wood standard’ 
(FSC Watch, 2006). 
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that such a response has been deployed; that they have chosen to ‘talk the walk’ rather than 
‘walk the talk’. In addition to the present study’s reliance on archival materials, then, the 
identification and further examining of deflation responses may need to rely on more 
anecdotal forms of evidence too.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented an analysis of an external legitimacy conflict involving one 
of the world’s largest MSIs, the UNGC. In doing so, we have shown how MSI legitimacy 
conflicts can focus on an MSI’s statutory procedures, mechanisms and objectives. We have 
also identified deflation as a third response strategy, alongside decoupling and moral 
entrapment, that MSIs and other organizations can employ when faced with integrity 
critiques that threaten their legitimacy. In the prior section, we offered an explanation of what 
initially seemed to be an unusual if not counter-intuitive response. Moreover, our analysis 
clearly and critically addresses the frequent call for more (empirical) research on the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the UNGC (e.g. Voegtlin & Pless, 2014).  
Our paper contributes to theory in several ways. First, we identify and explain how and 
why a deflation strategy can be a viable alternative for MSIs that allows them to combine 
their professed and actual policies in a way that differs from both the moral entrapment and 
decoupling responses. Although moral entrapment and decoupling have attracted most 
attention in the literature, we offer strong, inductively developed, reasons, for thinking that 
MSIs and other organizations will at least sometimes be inclined towards a deflationary 
response. The above noted examples of FIFA and FSC support this contention.  
Second, we suggest that there is a need to differentiate between three elements of MSIs 
that can be made the focus of legitimacy critiques: i.e., statutory procedures, mechanisms and 
objectives. We argue that this distinction can be helpful in furthering the debate on legitimacy 
conflicts as it allows researchers to engage in the more fine-grained analysis of legitimacy 
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conflicts. It can, for example, help reveal the ways in which MSIs and other organizations can 
seek to ensure that proprietary legitimacy critiques do not get out of hand, and proceed to 
undermine their validity; their shared, collectively held social legitimacy judgment.  
Third, our paper contributes to the abundant stream of work on UNGC by adding another, 
more critical, voice to that debate. Given the prominence of MSIs, and of the UNGC in 
particular, learning more about the ways in which such initiatives maintain their positions 
within a field is important to understand alternative forms of governance. 
Whilst novel and important, our findings have their limitations. As they are based on a 
single case, we consider it important for future research to further investigate what leads to 
MSIs deciding between the deflation response, the moral entrapment response, and the 
decoupling response. Although it would be worthwhile for such investigations to be directed 
at other types of organizations, we suggest that such analyses are likely to prove particularly 
influential in the case of MSIs, because legitimacy is the effective currency of their existence. 
As we have only shown that MSIs can deflate their statutory procedures and objectives, it 
would also be interesting to know more about how deflationary moves can be applied to MSI 
mechanisms (as in the case of the FSC). More generally, it would prove theoretically 
insightful to use our ideas to characterize a population of internal and/or external legitimacy 
conflicts within or across industries, fields, or regions. In short, are there any clear differences 
between whatever categories are chosen in terms of their objectives, mechanisms and 
statutory procedures, and if so, why? Additionally, it would be interesting to relate these 
questions to the debate on implicit versus explicit CSR in the UNGC (Brown, Clark & 
Buono, 2018) and other MSIs, and also to explore the link with research on institutional 
maintenance (Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 2013; Taupin, 2012). 
Our paper has implications for practice. On the one hand, it suggests that those concerned 
with the continued viability and potential success of MSIs – e.g., an MSI’s board and office – 
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will at least sometimes be better off by making their statutory procedures less democratic, 
and their objectives less onerous, post their initial establishment. Whatever the moral merits 
of such changes – which are prima facie difficult to endorse – some MSIs may find that 
deflation proves instrumentally useful in helping to protect them against (potential) validity 
threats, chiming in with a pragmatic approach to legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). On the other 
hand, we note that critical external parties need to be aware that actions guided by critical and 
transformative intentions could encourage MSIs to undertake measures that increase their 
protection against similar antagonisms in the future. Antagonists, in short, need to recognize 
that their efforts to battle incumbents may not only result in them being vanquished, but also 
in an increased likelihood of future antagonists being vanquished too. Deflation hence can be 
a forceful response for MSIs. 
Whether or not this state of affairs is considered disheartening, and the reasons why it 
might be considered as such, will depend on how one sees MSIs in the first place. For those 
who believe that MSIs are a development of great democratic promise, then clearly, our 
findings are likely to prove depressing. However, our findings are potentially also 
disheartening for those who would like to see MSIs diminish from their current level of 
relative prominence: for they suggest that apparently well-grounded critiques can prove not 
just inconsequential but even counter-productive to their critical aims. In short, and in duly 
noting that moral arguments lie well outside the scope of our present aims, we suggest that 
the empirical events we have discussed here can potentially inform a variety of normative 
positions on what ought to be happening with regard to MSIs, and to global governance more 
generally, offering ample room for further research and debate.  
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TABLE 1: CONFLICT EVENTS AND DATA SOURCES 







1 1a 12-5-2008 
Letter to UNGC (Exec. Director, Georg Kell) 
from 80+ Civil Society Organizations and 
Actors (the Signatories) 
http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/ Critical 5 
 1b 12-5-2008 Press Release for 1a http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/ Critical 2 
2 2 15-5-2008 
Letter from Georg Kell (UNGC ED) to 





3 3 2-7-2008 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's remarks 
at UNGC meeting in Beijing 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sgsm11677.doc.htm Supportive 5 
4 4 4-7-2008 





5 5 15-12-2008 
Letter to UNGC (Exec. Director, Georg Kell) 
from Signatories 
http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/ Critical 6 
6 6a 7-1-2009 
Letter to UNGC (Exec. Director, Georg Kell) 
from Signatories 
http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/ Critical 1 
 6b 7-1-2009 Press Release for 6b http://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/ Critical 2 
7 7 8-1-2009 
Letter from CNPC Nile Company to UNGC 




8 8 12-1-2009 
Letter from Georg Kell (UNGC ED) to 




9 9 1-2-2009 
Letter from IAG (Eric Cohen) and SOMO 
(Bart Slob) to UNGC Board Members 
http://investorsagainstgenocide.net/2009-0201 
UNGC Board letter.pdf 
Critical 2 
10 10 9-2-2009 
Letter from Mark Moody Stuart (Vice Chair, 
Global Compact Board) to IAG (Cohen) and 





11 11 23-2-2009 
Letter from IAG (Cohen) and SOMO (Slob) to 
Mark Moody Stuart (Response to 10)  
http://investorsagainstgenocide.net/2009-0223 Letter 
to Sir Mark Moody-Stuart.pdf 
Critical 1 
12 12a 24-7-2009 
Global Compact Board Meeting and Report - 




 Page 46 of 53 
uly2009_Final.pdf 




13 13 9-9-2009 





14 14 1/2-03-2010 
Press Release for Sudan Workshop on 
'Responsible Business and Investment in 
Conflict-Affected Areas', Burj Elfateh Hotel 




15 15 29-3-2010 
UNGC Good Practice Note on 'How Business 
Can Encourage Governments to Fulfil their 





16 16a May 2010 
UNGC and John Ruggie statement on link 









 16b Unknown 









18 18 June 2010 
UNGC and PRI 'Guidance on Responsible 





19 19 23-6-2010 
Hugh Williamson (Financial Times) article on 
Global Compact Critics: 'CSR in Emerging 








Joint Inspection Unit Report on 'United 
Nations corporate partnerships: The role and 
functioning of the Global Compact'  
https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/archive/ 
United Nations corporate partnerships -The role and 
functioning of the Global Compact.pdf 
Critical 30 





 21b 24-3-2011 UNGC Press Release for Event 21  https://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/109-03-24- Supportive 3 
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2011 
 21c 25-3-2011 
Mark Moody Stuart (Vice Chair, UN Global 






22 22 26-3-2011 





23 23 28-3-2011 


















27 27 26-3-2012 
Georg Kell (Executive Director, UNGC) 








29 29 1-9-2013 
UNGC Event Report - Sustainable Business 
and Investment in the Global Context: Rights, 
Risks and Responsibilities. Beijing, China, 16-






30 30 27-2-2015 
Global Compact Critics Blog announces that it 
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The UNGC is committed to promoting 
improved business performance with 
regard to human rights, labour, 
sustainable development, and anti-
corruption. In relating its human rights 
principles to the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, and further to other 
considerations, the UNGC is also 
associated with promoting the broader 
principles of (global) peace and security. 
The conflict itself related specifically to 
the UNGC's human rights principles, and 
to the concern to promote a peaceful, 
secure, and sustainable/developing, 
world. 
Supportive—Evidence of the description of, or of positive 
references to, human rights, peace, security, and 
sustainability/development. 
(Event 2: "The Global Compact Office and its Human Rights 
Working Group… stand ready to help participants with their 
efforts to support and promote the human rights embodied in the 
UDHR.") 
Critical—Reference to shortcomings or failings of human rights, 
peace, security, and sustainability/development; or to the need for 
some sort of alternative objectives. 
(Event 13: "According to the report, the [UNGC] Board decided 
to maintain PetroChina as a participant in the Compact, in spite 
of a complaint supported by over 80 civil society organizations… 
that PetroChina is complicit in human rights abuses in Sudan... 
The report of the Global Compact Board explains that 'the Board 
agreed that the operation of a company in a weakly governed or 
repressive environment would not be sole grounds for removal.") 
Null—No reference to UNGC’s operational objectives 
Stable—No reference to a recent or forthcoming 
change to the UNGC's operational objectives by 
the UNGC. 
(Event 2: "the [GCO] and its Human Rights 
Working Group… stand ready to help 
participants with their efforts to support and 
promote the human rights embodied in the 
UDHR.") 
Change—Reference to a recent or forthcoming 
change to the UNGC's operational objectives by 
the UNGC. 
(Event 8: "We are currently planning to embark 
on a study into the trade-offs between 
engagement and divestment in conflict-prone 
countries.") 




The UNGC is a voluntary initiative 
concerned to promote learning and 
deliberation amongst the business 
community as to best practice in 
corporate social responsibility. It is not an 
enforcement/hierarchic mechanism. 
Supportive—Evidence of the description of, or of (previous or 
possible) benefits relating to, the UNGC's learning and deliberative 
means. 
(Event 10: "the United Nations Global Compact is focused on 
practical engagement on the ground through learning, dialogue and 
partnerships.") 
Critical—Reference to shortcomings or failings of the UNGC's 
learning and deliberative means, or to the benefits of rule-based 
means. 
Stable—Reference to UNGC's mechanisms, but 
no reference to a recent or forthcoming change. 
(Event 10: "the United Nations Global Compact 
is focused on practical engagement on the 
ground through learning, dialogue and 
partnerships.") 
Change—Reference to recent or forthcoming 
change to UNGC’s mechanisms 
(No evidence found) 
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(Event 1: "The Global Compact is...often criticized by civil society 
organizations because of its purely voluntary nature.") 
Null—No reference to UNGC’s mechanisms 
Null—No reference to UNGC’s mechanisms 
Statutory Procedures  
 
The conflict was initiated when IAG and 
SOMO (and 'The Signatories') 
encouraged the UNGC to use its fourth 
integrity measure 'Allegations of 
Systematic or Egregious Abuses' to 
'discipline' PetroChina for the Sudanese 
operations of its parent company, 
PetroChina. More broadly, the conflict 
related to the governance structures (e.g., 
board membership) by which the UNGC is 
directed. 
Supportive—Evidence of the description of, or of positive 
references to, the UNGC's fourth integrity measure and/or its 
application; and to other aspects of the UNGC's structure (e.g., 
board membership).  
(Event 2: "Our role under the integrity measures is limited to 
encouraging dialogue between companies and those that make 
credible allegations of systematic or egregious abuse by 
companies of the Global Compact’s overall aims and 
principles.") 
Critical—Reference to shortcomings or failings of the UNGC's 
fourth integrity measure or its application; and/or to other aspects 
of the UNGC's structure (e.g., board membership). 
(Event 11: "The Global Compact... Office’s interpretation of the 
[Integrity] Measures is very different from ours. Our 
understanding of the process is that it does not call for evaluation 
of allegations but rather requires, at minimum, that the Global 
Compact Office request written comments from the accused 
company.") 
Null—No reference to UNGC’s statutory procedures 
Stable—No reference to a recent or forthcoming 
change to the UNGC's fourth integrity measure, 
or to other aspects of the UNGC's structure (e.g., 
board membership), by the UNGC. 
(Event 2: "Our role under the integrity measures 
is limited to encouraging dialogue between 
companies and those that make credible 
allegations of systematic or egregious abuse by 
companies of the Global Compact’s overall aims 
and principles.") 
Change—Reference to a recent or forthcoming 
change to the UNGC's fourth integrity measure, 
or to other aspects of the UNGC's structure (e.g., 
board membership), by the UNGC  
(Event 10: "We will also review the processes 
described in the integrity measures to see 
whether greater clarity is needed.") 
Null—No reference to UNGC’s statutory 
procedures 
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Objectives Mechanisms Statutory Procedures 
Value Dynamics Value Dynamics Value Dynamics 
1 Critical Supportive Stable Critical Stable Supportive Stable 
2 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Supportive Stable 
3 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable -- -- 
4 Critical Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Critical Stable 
5 Critical Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Critical Stable 
6 Critical Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Critical Stable 
7 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable -- -- 
8 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable Supportive Stable 
9 Critical Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Critical Stable 
10 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable Supportive Change 
11 Critical -- -- -- -- Critical Change 
12 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable Supportive Change 
13 Critical Critical Change -- -- Critical Stable 
14 Supportive Supportive Change -- -- -- -- 
15 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable -- -- 
16 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable -- -- 
17 Critical Critical Change -- -- -- -- 
18 Supportive Supportive Change Supportive Stable -- -- 
19 Critical Supportive Stable Critical Stable Critical Change 
20 Critical Critical Stable Critical Stable Critical Stable 
21 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Supportive Stable 
22 Critical Supportive Stable Critical Stable Critical Stable 
23 Critical Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Critical Stable 
24 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Supportive Change 
25 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Supportive Change 
26 Critical -- -- -- -- Critical Change 
27 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable Supportive Change 
28 Critical -- -- -- -- Supportive Change 
29 Supportive Supportive Stable Supportive Stable -- -- 
30 Critical -- -- Critical Stable -- -- 
Note: “--” indicates that no information was found (‘null’) 
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FIGURE 1: DECOUPLING, MORAL ENTRAPMENT, AND DEFLATION 
 
 
Note: In each of the three illustrated responses, t=1 depicts a situation that has alternatively been labeled as mission drift, organizational 
hypocrisy, window-dressing, green washing, lack of integrity, inauthenticity, etcetera.  
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